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Abstract in English 
A renewable obligation combined with tradable renewable energy certificates is a market-based 
instrument used to promote the production of electricity from renewable energy sources. A 
renewable obligation is an alternative for subsidies. A renewable obligation will only be an 
efficient instrument if certificate markets are efficient. This requires that there is no market 
power and no anti-competitive behaviour on the certificate market. If the current developments 
in Dutch renewable energy production continue, market power on a future renewable certificate 
market in the Netherlands will probably not be an issue, even if the RO should only rest on the 
retail market instead of on the whole electricity market. 
A renewable obligation will raise the retail price for consumers, thereby reducing consumer 
surplus. Simulations show that the retail electricity price increases with € 30 per MWh to a level 
of € 104 per MWh in case of a 30% renewable target. Consumer surplus is reduced with 19% 
compared to the baseline scenario. In contrast, a subsidy such as the Dutch SDE which is 
financed from the state budget has the effect to (slightly) lower the retail electricity price, 
thereby increasing consumer surplus. It should however be realised that the costs of the subsidy 
will indirectly affect electricity consumers through their tax payments. 
 
Key words: Renewable energy, renewable obligation, subsidy, market power 
 
JEL code: Q42, Q48 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Een verplichting voor een aandeel duurzame energie gecombineerd met een markt voor 
duurzame-energiecertificaten kan een efficiënt instrument zijn om de productie van duurzaam 
opgewekte elektriciteit te stimuleren. Een voorwaarde daarvoor is wel dat de markt voor deze 
certificaten niet wordt belemmerd door misbruik van marktmacht. Als de huidige trends in de 
ontwikkeling van de productie van duurzaam opgewekte elektriciteit in Nederland zich 
voortzetten, zal misbruik van marktmacht waarschijnlijk geen probleem zijn op een eventuele 
toekomstige Nederlandse certificatenmarkt. 
Een doelstelling voor hernieuwbare energie zal tot een hogere elektriciteitsprijs voor 
consumenten leiden. Simulaties laten zien dat de prijs stijgt met €30 per MWh bij een 
doelstelling van 30% duurzame energie. Het consumentensurplus daalt dan met 19% vergeleken 
met het baselinescenario. Een subsidie die wordt gefinancierd vanuit het overheidsbudget, zoals 
momenteel de SDE, leidt niet tot hogere prijzen. Consumenten worden dan echter wel 
geconfronteerd met de kosten van duurzame energie via hun belastingafdrachten. 
 
Steekwoorden: Duurzame energie, duurzame-energieverplichting 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   4   5 
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Preface 
Both national and international the use of renewable energy is being encouraged. In 2008, the 
European Commission has established a renewable energy target of 20% in 2020. In 2007, the 
Dutch government has formulated a comparable target for renewable energy in 2020 in its 
energy- and climate programme ‘Schoon en Zuinig’ (Clean and efficient). 
 
In both the Netherlands and in Europe, subsidies have been the most used instrument to 
promote the production of renewable energy. An alternative is a renewable obligation combined 
with a market for renewable energy certificates. In this document, the authors consider the 
working of a possible future ‘green’ certificate market for the Netherlands. They would like to 
thank EnerQ, the Dutch organisation which administered the Dutch renewable energy subsidy 
MEP, for the data it has made available on renewable energy production in the Netherlands. 
The effects on the electricity market of introducing a renewable obligation have been explored 
using the COMPETES model of ECN, a model of the North-West European electricity market. 
 
The authors benefited from the discussions with the members of a feedback group. In 
particular they are grateful for the comments and reflections of Klaas-Jan Koops (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs). Comments from colleagues at CPB also helped to improve this study.  9 
Summary 
A renewable obligation combined with tradable renewable energy certificates is a market-based 
instrument used to promote the production of electricity from renewable energy sources. It has 
recently been introduced in a number of countries and is an alternative for subsidies, the 
instrument which has predominantly been used both in Europe and the Netherlands. 
RO schemes are expected to be effective in developing new capacity especially in the longer 
run, given long term targets for the production of electricity from renewable sources. However, 
experience with RO schemes so far has been too short to draw definitive conclusions about the 
effectiveness and efficiency of RO compared with subsidies. Comparing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of subsidies and RO has been further complicated because other factors than 
instrument choice have had a significant effect on the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
support schemes, such as non-economic barriers and local conditions. 
In principle, certificate prices in an RO should be higher than subsidies, because of the price 
risks producers face on the certificate market. These risks do not occur in the case of subsidies. 
Whether in practice subsidies will be lower depends on the ability of the government to 
accurately predict the costs of renewables and set the subsidy accordingly. Costs of renewables 
might also be higher with an RO because of regulatory risks. These will to a large extent depend 
on the credibility of the government in maintaining a stable policy over the years. With an RO, 
flexibility in target setting and design of the scheme comes at the price of higher regulatory 
risks for producers of RES-E and therefore higher costs. 
An RO will only be an efficient instrument if certificate markets are efficient. One of the 
prerequisites for an efficient market is that there is no market power and no anti-competitive 
behaviour. If the current developments in Dutch RES-E production continue, market power on a 
future renewable certificate market in the Netherlands will probably not be an issue, even if the 
RO should only rest on the retail market instead of on the whole electricity market. The current 
concentration rate is moderate and there is a downward trend. Possible forms of anti-
competitive behaviour such as collusion or foreclosure will probably not be an issue. Extending 
the obligation to all purchasers on the wholesale market instead of only the retail market would 
further reduce the likelihood for anti-competitive behaviour. 
An RO scheme affects consumers in a different way from a subsidy such as the current 
Dutch SDE subsidy. An RO raises the retail price for consumers, thereby reducing consumer 
surplus. The decrease in consumer surplus occurs for two reasons. One reason is the higher 
costs of renewables, the second is a transfer to producers of renewable electricity who will 
make a profit on the certificate market. On this market, the price will be set by costs of the 
marginal producer or technology. Lower cost producers of renewable electricity will receive a 
rent (producer surplus). This producer surplus for renewable electricity producers will be higher 
the higher the renewables target is, because more expensive technologies will have to be used to 
meet the target. Simulations have been run with a model of the Northwest European electricity   10 
market (COMPETES), which show that the electricity price increases with € 30 per MWh to a 
level of € 104 per MWh in the case of a 30% renewable target. Consumer surplus is reduced 
with 19% compared to the baseline scenario. With a 20% renewables target, consumer surplus 
will only be 6% lower. 
In contrast, a subsidy such as the SDE which is financed from the state budget has the effect 
to (slightly) lower the retail electricity price, thereby increasing consumer surplus. It should 
however be realised that the costs of the subsidy will indirectly affect electricity consumers in 
through their tax payments. 
 
   11 
1  Introduction 
Renewable energy has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Not only will it reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, it is also expected to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels. 
Therefore, many countries have introduced targets for the share of renewable energy in total 
energy demand. In its “20 20 in 2020” climate and energy policy package (EC, 
2008d), the EU has formulated a target of a 20% renewable energy share in final demand in 
2020. In the Netherlands, the current government has set a target of 20% of primary energy 
consumption in 2020, a slightly higher target than the EU-wide target which is formulated as a 
share of primary energy use (VROM, 2007). 
The main instruments used to stimulate electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) 
are subsidies in various forms and, more recent, renewable obligations (RO) combined with a 
market for tradable renewable energy certificates. In this study, we will consider whether the 
introduction of an RO scheme in the Netherlands is a feasible alternative for the subsidies 
which have been used so far. We focus on two issues. First, we examine whether anti-
competitive behaviour would be a problem on the certificate market or the related electricity 
market if an RO scheme would be introduced in the Netherlands. Second, we compare the 
distributional consequences of RO and subsidies for electricity producers and consumers. 
An important difference between subsidies and an RO is the creation of a market for 
renewable certificates in an RO scheme. Producers of RES-E receive a renewable energy 
certificate for each unit of RES-E they produce. They can sell these certificates to parties who 
have to meet a renewables obligation, such as, for example, distribution companies. An RO 
scheme will only be efficient if there is a well functioning certificate market which is not prone 
to anti-competitive behaviour. Given the possible limited number of RES-E producers obliged 
parties in a Dutch RO scheme, this could potentially be a problem. Starting from the RES-E 
producers currently active on the market, we will identify possible forms of anti-competitive 
behaviour such as collusion and foreclosure which might be a problem on a certificate market. 
Applying the policy framework developed in the CPB 2008 on foreclosure, we indicate under 
which conditions misuse of market power might be a problem. 
On a certificate market, all certificates will be sold at the same price, regardless of the costs 
made to generate the RES-E and thereby acquire the certificate. Consequently, producers with 
lower costs will make a larger profit then those producing at the margin. In RES-E production, 
there can be barriers for low-cost technologies such as biomass cofiring in coal plants or wind 
onshore. If the RO is set at such a level that higher costs technologies are needed to fulfil the 
obligation, RES-E producers using biomass cofiring and wind onshore will realise an intra-
marginal rent (which has been called a windfall profit in policy circles). While this is not a 
problem from an efficiency point of view, it does have distributional consequences. Consumers 
will have to pay more in an RO compared with a subsidy while producers will realise higher 
profits. We analyse these distributional effects on producers and consumers on both the   12 
electricity market and the certificate market. The effects are quantified with the use of the 
COMPETES model, a model of the North-West European electricity market which has been 
developed at ECN. 
We conclude that, if the current developments in Dutch RES-E production continue, 
competitive issues on a Dutch certificate market will probably not be an issue. This holds even 
if the RO should only rest on the retail market instead of on the whole electricity market.  
The effects on electricity prices, consumers and producers differ considerably between an RO 
scheme and a subsidy which is financed from the state budget. Whereas an RO schemes raises 
the retail price, the effect of a subsidy is to lower power prices to some extent. The costs for 
consumers and the intra-marginal rent are considerably higher in the RO scheme compared with 
the subsidy, especially with a high renewables obligation which makes it necessary to use high 
cost RES-E technologies. 
Our analysis is limited to market behaviour and distributional consequences. While these are 
important issues with regard to the choice between the two policy instruments investigated here, 
they do not provide a complete picture. There are other issues which will influence instrument 
choice, such as, for example, policy continuity, European and neighbouring countries policies
1. 
Another question relating to the use of renewable energy which is not addressed in this study is 
whether governments should promote renewable energy at all. While this study does not 
address this question
2, it should be realised this important question should be answered before 
the optimal choice of instruments is considered. 
In the next chapter, we introduce the most important instruments used to stimulate 
renewable energy and discuss briefly the main differences between RO and subsidies. In 
chapter 3, the current RES-E production structure in the Netherlands is described, which is used 
as a starting point for the analysis of possible anti-competitive behaviour on a future renewable 
energy certificate market. The distributional impacts of RO and subsidies are discussed in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1 See 2.3 for an overview of the vast literature on RES-E instrument choice. 
2 For a cost-benefit analysis of renewable energy, see CPB 2005   13 
2  RO schemes and subsidies 
The two most widely applied instruments used to promote renewable energy are price-based 
market instruments such as subsidies and quantity-based market instruments in the form of a 
renewable obligation combined with tradable renewable certificates
3. The general properties of 
RO schemes are described in section 2.1, followed by an overview of subsidies. In section 2.3, 
an overview is given of the comparison between the two instruments in the literature. 
2.1  Renewable obligations 
Central in an RO scheme is the combination of an obligation to generate or provide a certain 
amount of power from renewable energy sources with tradable renewable energy certificates. 
The obligation can be met with renewable certificates, which the obliged parties can acquire on 
the certificate market. Assuming that the obligation is binding, the certificates will sell at a price 
equal to the additional costs of RES-E production, compared with the production of electricity 
from conventional sources. 
A certificate market is an artificial market which is created by the government. 
Consequently, certificate prices will be influenced by choices made in the design of the scheme 
such as: 
 
•  Scope of the scheme 
•  Technologies 
•  Banking and price caps 
•  Target level 
 
Scope 
An important element in the design of a green certificate scheme is to determine which part of 
electricity use falls under the obligation. Total electricity consumption could fall under the 
obligation or it could be limited to part of the electricity market, such as, for example, the retail 
market. It is not efficient to put the administrative burden of acquiring and handing in 
certificates on all end-users of electricity, large and small. Instead, the administrative obligation 
can be put higher in the supply chain, depending on the coverage of the system. With a scheme 
limited to the retail market, the administrative obligation can be put on the retail companies. 
They do not have to produce the renewable electricity themselves, but can fulfil their obligation 
with renewable electricity certificates which they acquire from producers of green electricity.  
 
3 The instrument has been applied under various names. In the US, it is commonly described as a renewables portfolio 
standard while in the UK it is called the renewables obligation.   14 
In such a scheme, the costs of the renewables target will be born only by those consumers that 
buy their electricity from retailers. Consumers who buy their electricity directly on the 
wholesale market will not bear the costs of the renewables obligation. 
If the obligation is put on all producers and importers of electricity, the additional costs of 
the renewables obligation will be paid by all electricity consumers. In this case, the 
administrative obligation will need to rest on all generators and importers, including firms 
which produce or import their own electricity. This will increase the administrative and 
transaction costs of the scheme, compared with a scheme for the retail market only. 
Technologies 
In order to be eligible for a certificate, the technology used has to be included in the RO 
scheme. The choice of technologies will have consequences for both the costs and the 
distributional effects of the obligation. For example, including renewable energy technologies 
which are profitable, given electricity prices on the market, will lower the price of the 
certificates compared with a scheme which excludes those technologies. These profitable 
technologies will acquire a rent from being included if the marginal unit on the market has 
positive costs. 
A related issue is whether existing capacity is to be included. This also depends on current 
and past incentive schemes which apply to existing capacity. Existing capacity might have been 
written off or might still receive subsidies from an earlier support scheme such as for example a 
subsidy. Allowing such capacity to sell certificates would grant them the value of certificates 
which would not be required to cover their costs. Keeping existing capacity out of the market 
however would reduce the size of the market and result in a higher price. 
The choice of technologies will not be a one time concern. Costs of many renewable 
technologies such as, for example, wind offshore and solar, are expected to fall over time. This 
will lower the price of renewables certificates. Moreover, certain technologies might become 
profitable and would at that stage not require support for deployment. 
Banking and price caps 
In the certificate schemes which have been implemented so far, the price of certificates has been 
limited by a maximum price or penalty which can be paid instead of acquiring certificates. The 
main argument for this maximum price is the stochastic character of renewable resources such 
as wind, hydro and sun. Given the yearly variations in wind, rainfall and sunshine, the 
production of RES-E will show considerable variations over years. Consequently, prices of 
certificates will be volatile with substantial price peaks in years with low production and low 
prices in high production years. This volatility can be addressed in two ways. One is to allow 
banking of certificates from one compliance period to the next. The other option is to introduce 
a maximum price (in addition, a minimum price could also be introduced). As shown by 
Amundsen (2005), both instruments will reduce price volatility. However, whereas banking will   15 
increase welfare (because the constraint on intertemporal trade is relaxed), minimum or 
maximum price bounds can reduce welfare because it restricts the market in green certificates. 
In the Dutch context, biomass in coal- or gas-powered plants could provide up to 18% of 
electricity demand within the Netherlands in 2007 (see section 3.1). In contrast with wind, the 
use of biomass does not depend on the weather and the production level can be varied at short 
notice by the generator. Biomass therefore provides flexibility which will limit the price 
volatility. In a windy year, the high volume of wind turbines will put a downward pressure on 
the certificate price, which will induce biomass generators to reduce their volume until price 
equals their marginal costs. In a year with less than average wind, the high certificate price will 
bring on more biomass, driving down the price. Therefore, price volatility will be less of an 
issue in a Dutch certificate market compared with RO which include more stochastic renewable 
sources. 
Another reason given for a price cap is to limit the costs of meeting the target in case 
investments in new capacity are not enough to produce sufficient RES-E to meet the obligation. 
Without a price cap, the price of certificates could rise considerably, given the lack of 




A determining factor in an RO is the target which has to be met. Not only the target level itself 
will determine the certificate price, the period for which the target is set and the duration for 
which technologies receive certificates will also have consequences. Investments in renewable 
energy projects have a long life span. Therefore the renewables target over the life span of a 
project should be known in order for market parties to form expectations about future prices of 
green certificates. This is also influenced by the period for which certificates are granted. If this 
period is limited to less than the life span of a project, targets will have to be known for this 
period only. Limiting the duration for which certificates are granted will increase their price, as 
the additional investment costs will have to be recovered over a shorter period. 
2.2  Subsidies 
Subsidies have been applied in various forms. Basically, two main types of subsidy can be 
distinguished, feed-in tariffs (FIT) and premiums. A feed-in tariff offers a technology-specific 
subsidy for RES-E, consisting of both a payment for the electricity delivered and a 
compensation for the additional costs of producing RES-E, compared with the competitive costs 
of electricity production. An example of such a feed-in tariff is the German EEG (Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz).   16 
Premiums subsidize only the additional costs of RES-E, leaving it to the producers of RES-E to 
sell their electricity separately. Both the Milieu Energie Premie (MEP) and the current 
Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie (SDE) are examples of such premium schemes. 
FIT and premiums can differ in the period over which subsidies are given, whether the 
premiums or tariffs are fixed over time or flexible, how access to the grid is arranged and 
whether the subsidy scheme is limited by a maximum budget or open ended. 
The length of the period will have an effect on the level of subsidy, with investment projects 
requiring a higher yearly subsidy to break even the shorter the period is. The subsidies need not 
be set at one fixed rate for the duration of the subsidy. It can be specified in advance that 
subsidies will be lowered stepwise, reflecting expectations about declining costs. This is the 
case in the German EEG since the revision in 2004. Moreover, subsidies can be adjusted to 
changing circumstances such as, for example, the electricity price. In the Dutch MEP, there was 
only limited flexibility for the government to adjust the subsidy levels which had large 
consequences for the profitability of RES-E project. The return on projects increased 
significantly with the increase in wholesale electricity prices in the years after 2001. In the 
SDE, the premium is adjusted at the end of the year on the basis of the realised wholesale 
electricity price. 
In order to determine the subsidy level for the individual technologies, the government has 
to have accurate knowledge about the costs of producing RES-E. In addition, if the subsidy is 
fixed in advance, assumptions have to be made about future electricity prices for the duration of 
the subsidy. Given uncertainty and asymmetric information, the government will not be able to 
set the subsidy such that it precisely covers the additional costs. In case costs will on average be 
higher than expected, less RES-E will be produced
4. With lower than expected costs, for 
example because costs decline faster over time than assumed a priori, projects will be more 
profitable. 
2.3  Comparing renewable obligations and subsidies  
Assuming perfect information, zero transaction costs and an efficient certificate market, RO 
schemes and subsidies can be equally effective. A subsidy p can be introduced which results in 
quantity q, or the obligation can be set at q, which will result in a certificate price of p (Finon 
and Menanteau, 2006). However, in case of incomplete information and uncertainty, the 
instruments will not be equivalent. With uncertainty about the costs of producing renewables 
and about energy prices, the quantity of RES-E produced under a subsidy is uncertain. If costs 
are higher or energy prices lower than anticipated, less will be produced than expected ex ante. 
 
4 Assuming that there is a range of costs for projects using the same technology. For example, because of differing local 
wind speeds or differences in the efficiency of a project.   17 
With an RO scheme, the quantity is fixed, regardless of costs and prices. Instead, total costs will 
be higher if the costs of RES-E production are higher than predicted. 
Uncertainty will also create risks for other parties such as developers of RES-E projects and 
consumers. These risks are affected by the choice of instrument, which can introduce additional 
risks or distribute risks differently over producers, consumers and government. We will first 
consider the risks faced by producers of RES-E. The risks considered are regulatory risk, risks 
on both the certificate market and the power market and balancing risks. Subsequently, the 
consequences for governments and consumers will be discussed. 
2.3.1  Regulatory risks 
Flexibility in policy targets and policy design allows governments to adjust to changing 
circumstances or to new information. However, this flexibility comes at a price. Frequent policy 
changes increase the risks for market parties. This regulatory risk applies to both instruments. 
An example of regulatory risks associated with an RO is a change in the level of the obligation. 
In the case of a subsidy, the tariff or premium level can be changed, technologies can be 
excluded from the scheme or the whole support scheme can be terminated. 
From a macro, industry point of view, the regulatory risks do not differ fundamentally 
between the two instruments. In either case, there is the risk of policy changes which will 
change the market conditions for the industry. From the point of view of an individual project, 
however, there is a considerable difference between the instruments. Under a feed-in tariff such 
as formerly the MEP or the SDE in the Netherlands, investors will receive a guaranteed subsidy 
for a given number of years. This is regardless of possible changes or abolishment of the 
scheme in later years, because the conditions for and the level of the subsidy are set when the 
investment decision is taken. With an RO, the revenue they will earn depends on the market 
price for renewables. Changes in the obligation level or of the specifics of the obligation will 
have an effect on the certificate market and therefore on the price paid for the certificates. In 
contrast to a feed-in tariff, grandfathering of the support scheme with an RO is not possible 
because the level of support is determined on the market. Regulatory risk under an obligation 
scheme therefore introduces additional uncertainty about future revenues from renewable 
investment projects. This will increase the risk premium investors will demand and therefore 
the costs of renewable energy, compared with feed-in tariffs. The size of this risk premium will 
depend on how investors assess the credibility of the government in committing itself to 
maintain the support scheme over a longer period without change. 
2.3.2  Market risks 
In an RO scheme, producers of RES-E do not receive a guaranteed price for their renewable 
energy, as is the case with a feed-in tariff. Furthermore, they have no guarantee that they can 
sell the certificates produced, as is the case with a subsidy. There are several reasons why prices 
and volumes might vary. New producers might enter the market that can produce at lower costs   18 
(due for example to newer, less costly technology). This will reduce the certificate price and 
therefore revenue for the established firms. It can also affect the volume which the established 
producers will be able to sell, because they might lose market share to new entrants.
5 
Furthermore, in an RO scheme in which wind has a large market share, varying wind 
conditions can lead to large volume and price fluctuations between years. With a subsidy, 
producers are shielded from these price fluctuations. However, these price fluctuations can be 
reduced by allowing for banking (see section 2.1). Banking provides producers the opportunity 
to put aside part of the certificates in a year with a high (wind) production and sell them in a 
year with a low level of production, which will dampen price fluctuations. Furthermore, in a 
calm year the lower production volume will be compensated by an increase in the price (and 
vice versa), thereby diminishing the effect of wind fluctuations on revenue (Lemming 2003). 
Producers of RES-E not only have to sell their renewable certificates, they will also have to sell 
their electricity on the power market and therefore face price and volume risks on the electricity 
market. The electricity market is influenced by factors such as macro-economic development, 
changes in fossil fuel prices and changes in CO2 prices. The electricity prices are based on the 
marginal production unit in the merit order. In the Netherlands, these are gas fired generation 
plants or coal plants. Changes in gas or coal prices are therefore reflected in the electricity price, 
therefore RES-E producers will be exposed to the price volatility of fossil fuels. In addition, 
changes in CO2 prices in the ETS will also affect the price of electricity, introducing further 
risks (including the regulatory uncertainty regarding the future developments of the ETS) for 
RES-E producers. It should be noted that long-run price fluctuations on the electricity market 
will to some extent be mitigated by changes in the certificate prices. A decrease in the 
electricity price will increase the additional costs of RES-E production, driving up the price on 
the certificate market.  
With a subsidy, there is neither a price risk nor a volume risk for RES-E producers. The 
tariff is known in advance and purchase of the produced green electricity is assured. With a 
premium such as the SDE, producers receive a subsidy for the additional costs of RES-E 
production and have to sell the electricity on the power market. In principle this would expose 
them to price risks on the electricity market. However, the SDE subsidy is adjusted for the 




5 However, entry of new firms will be limited because of the sunk costs incurred with investments in renewable energy 
projects, such as wind or solar where total costs are to a large extent determined by the sunken investment costs. Given 
these sunk costs, incumbent firms have an advantage vis-à-vis potential entrants who will be reluctant to enter the market 
because they are not sure that they will be able to sell certificates at a price which allows them to recoup their investment 
costs (Agnolucci 2007, Gersoki, P. A. (1991): Market Dynamics and Entry. Blackwell, Oxford). 
6 In the SDE, there is a maximum set for the subsidy. This does create some risk for investors, because below certain 
electricity prices the revenue from the subsidy will not cover the full additional.   19 
2.3.3  Balancing risks 
On electricity grids, supply and demand need to be balanced in real time. Electricity cannot be 
stored, therefore electricity has to be produced when it is consumed. This makes flexible power 
supply, such as power produced by gas-fired plants, more attractive than power from wind 
energy which is difficult to predict and has only limited options to be reduced (except switching 
off). Depending on market regulation, the costs of the balancing risk can be put on the 
producers of RES-E or they can be guaranteed access to the grid regardless of time and demand. 
In the UK RO scheme, RES-E producers bear the whole balancing risk. In the Spanish subsidy 
scheme, the balancing risk born by RES-E producers depends on the tariff scheme chosen, a 
fixed feed in tariff or a premium on top of the electricity price. Under the fixed feed-in tariff, 
RES-E producers will pay a balancing price if they deviate from a production schedule which 
they have to provide in advance by certain margins. In the case of the premium tariff, they get a 
subsidy in addition to the price they can make for their electricity on the power market, which 
includes the balancing risk. In the German EEG, the balancing risk is born by the grid 
operators. This was also the case with the Dutch MEP subsidy. In the current SDE subsidy, 
producers have to bear the balancing risk. 
Whoever bears the balancing risk is not determined by the support system as such, it is 
determined by the specific rules which apply to access to the grid for RES-E producers. Under 
an RO scheme, grid operators could bear the balancing risk, just as under a tariff scheme such 
as in Germany. 
2.3.4  Risks and costs 
As a consequence of the higher risks which investors face under an RO, the risk premium for 
RES-E projects as compared with a feed-in tariff will be higher. However, the lower risks 
associated with feed-in tariffs are not necessarily reflected in the level of subsidies given under 
feed-in tariffs. On the contrary, feed-in tariffs appear to have generated high return on 
investments, on average in the order of 10-15%, according to Menanteau (2003), who report a 
relatively high return on investment with feed-in tariffs which is on average in the order of 10-
15%. Similar results have been found in an evaluation of the Dutch MEP subsidy, which finds 
profits which are considerably higher than the 15% return on equity on which the subsidy tariffs 
had been based (CE 2007, see also IEA 2008). 
Long-term contracts can cover the risks, such as the uncertainty over electricity prices, but 
the risk will then be born by the buying party, which will be reflected in the lower price which 
RES-E producers will receive for long-term contracts as compared with short term contracts. In 
the UK, long-term contracting appears to be limited, according to Johnston (2007). Although 
contract terms are confidential, prices in long-term contracts appear to be significantly lower 
than those in short-term contracts. In the US, some states include the obligation to use long-
term contracts for certain forms of RES-E. The available evidence indicates that prices paid for   20 
RES-E are lower in states where long-term contracts dominate as compared with states where 
long-term contracts are hardly used (Wiser 2008). 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates how the costs associated with the various risks identified above affect 
individual RES-E projects under different support schemes. Additional risks increase the 
revenue requirement for producers of RES-E in order to cover the costs associated with extra 
risks.  
Figure 2.1  Costs and Risks of renewable energy projects 
 
With a feed-in tariff, producers will only face project-related risks such as technology failing or 
unexpectedly high maintenance costs. The SDE-scheme adds some price- and volume-risks on 
the electricity market, although these will be mitigated by the ex-post adjustment of the subsidy 
to the electricity prices. However, some risks remain such as the risk of not being able to find a 
buyer for the electricity produced. With a renewables obligation, price- and volume-risks on the 
certificate market (including risks from volatility of wind resources) will increase the revenue 
requirement to make a project profitable. To some extent, these risks will be mitigated by price 
changes on the electricity market because electricity prices and certificate prices will be 
negatively correlated. Last, regulatory risks concerning future RO design will increase the 
returns required. 
2.3.5  Risks for governments and consumers 
While producers of RES-E face less risks with feed-in tariffs and premiums as opposed to an 
RO, this does not mean that this represents an absolute decrease in variability of volume and 
costs from a societal point of view. Risks do not necessarily disappear, they will instead be born   21 
by other parties than the investor, such as the government or electricity retailer. Furthermore, 
cost fluctuations will, depending on market conditions, be passed on to either customers or 
taxpayers. The price and volume risks on the certificate market and the electricity market which 
are born by producers of RES-E in an RO scheme will ultimately rest on the electricity 
consumers. 
With a subsidy, there are no certificate market price and volume risks for RES-E producers 
and electricity market risks are limited. Instead, the government budget or consumer 
expenditure on electricity will fluctuate . This is illustrated by the experience with the Dutch 
MEP, which showed a large increase in expenditure in 2002 and 2003. The increase in 
electricity prices from 2002 onward increased the profitability of RES-E, given the premium. 
As a result, production of RES-E increased substantially, especially from (liquid) biomass co-
firing, which did not require large investments with long start-up times. Expenditure on the 
MEP- subsidy therefore increased as well, from € 76 million in 2003 to 594 in 2005 
(www.minez.nl, 2009-04-21). 
2.3.6  Empirical evidence on the effectiveness and efficiency of support schemes 
There are various reasons why it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the different support 
schemes based on empirical evidence. First of all, while price instruments have been used for 
long periods in various countries, the experience with RO is more limited and only from recent 
years. Data on the performance of RO schemes are therefore limited. 
Another complication is that other factors than the choice between instruments have had a 
significant effect on the effectiveness of support schemes. Non-economic barriers such as, for 
example, planning delays and restrictions, grid access and electricity market design have 
considerably affected the success of support schemes
7. Furthermore, local situations differ in for 
example the availability of natural resources such as average wind speeds and solar radiation. 
Another complicating factor is that the subsidies and RO schemes implemented so far differ 
significantly in their actual implementation which makes it difficult to draw overall conclusions 
on the effectiveness and efficiency of generic support instruments. 
The relative success of a policy should not only be judged on its effectiveness, but also on 
the costs of achieving its target. While a large number of studies provide information on the 
price support given by both feed-in tariffs and ROs in various countries, these studies rarely 
take into account the specific details of support schemes such as the ambition level and local 
conditions. An exception is the study by Butler and Neuhoff (2004) who take into account 
differences in average wind speed between Germany and UK. They estimate that, from 2012 
onwards, the price for renewable obligation certificates (ROCs) in the UK will be below the 
tariff paid for wind in the German EEG. It should however be noted that this estimate is a 
projection, it has to be seen whether this will be realised in practice. 
 
7 See IEA study 2008 for a recent overview and analysis of renewable policy instruments. 
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Given the available evidence, it should be concluded that the experience to date does not 
provide clear, definitive conclusions on the effectiveness and efficiency of price versus quantity 
support schemes. 
2.3.7  Conclusions 
Experience to date does not allow to draw clear conclusions on the effectiveness of either 
subsidies or an RO, because other factors than instrument choice have had a significant effect 
on the effectiveness and efficiency of the support schemes, such as non-economic barriers and 
local conditions. 
The major differences between RO and subsidies concern the risks which RE-E producers 
face under the different support schemes. Certificate prices in an RO would in principle be 
higher than subsidies, because market risks which are reflected in the certificate price are not 
faced by RES-E producers under a subsidy. Instead, government (and therefore taxpayers) is 
faced with fluctuating costs and an uncertain volume of RES-E produced. Whether in practice 
subsidies will be efficient and therefore lower depends on the ability of the government to 
accurately predict the costs of renewables and set the tariffs or premiums accordingly. 
Costs of renewables might be higher with an RO because of regulatory risks. These will to a 
large extent depend on the credibility of the government in maintaining a stable policy over the 
years. With an RO, flexibility in target setting and design of the scheme comes at the price of 
higher regulatory risks for producers of RES-E and therefore higher costs. 
The efficiency of an RO depends on the design of the scheme and on whether there will be a 
well functioning certificate market. In the next chapter, design options for an RO scheme in the 
Netherlands will be discussed. Subsequently, in chapter 3 it will be analysed whether there will 
be a competitive certificate market in the Netherlands.   23 
3  Market analysis 
3.1  Renewable energy certificate markets 
3.1.1  General characteristics of renewable energy certificate markets 
An important characteristic of renewable energy certificate markets is that the government 
creates demand by obliging parties to participate in the market. Without this government 
intervention, the market for renewable energy certificates would be limited to voluntary 
purchase of renewable electricity. Government policy creates the demand for certificates 
through the obligation that is put on parties to supply or consume a certain (relative or absolute) 
amount of green electricity, an obligation that must be met with green certificates. A change in 
government policies such as an increase of the target or obliging more parties to buy certificates 
will influence demand. The parties with the obligation are the buyers in the market. Their 
number will depend on where in the vertical chain the obligation is placed. In most RO 
schemes, the obligation is put on retail suppliers. Another option is to include all parties who 
buy electricity on the wholesale market (as in the Australian MRET scheme), which can 
significantly increase the number of buyers on the market. 
On the supply side of renewable energy certificate markets, are the generators of renewable 
electricity, who produce both certificates and electricity. Government policy has a direct 
influence on the supply side of the market as well, because the government determines which 
technologies are eligible for certificates. 
In addition to the suppliers and end-users, brokers and (financial) traders might be active on 
the market, providing services such as searching for counterparts for a trade, risk reduction etc. 
The extent to which these types of market participants will enter the market will among other 
things depend on the development of the market. In an immature, shallow market with a limited 
number of participants, brokers can play an important role. 
In most markets for renewable electricity certificates, long-term contracts are an important 
feature. Most renewables production is characterised by high up-front capital costs and low 
operating and maintenance costs. If uncertainty about pay-offs is high, banks may not be willing 
to provide loans. Long-term contracts reduce uncertainty. Especially small scale, independent 
producers therefore favour, and often need, long-term contracts in order to acquire the 
necessary loans for the investment. 
3.1.2  Market structure in existing RO schemes 
Experience with RO schemes is limited and mostly confined to the last three or four years. 
Moreover, information on market structure is scarce. Only for the UK and for Australia there is 
some limited information on the structure of the ROC market. 
Mitchell  et.  al.  (2006)  report  that  trading  of  ROCs  in  the  UK  ROC  scheme  is  limited 
because of the vertical integration between the larger generating companies and their in-house   24 
suppliers on whom rests the renewables obligation. As a consequence, the market for ROCs 
tends to be illiquid. However, concentration levels appear to be low, as is the case  on the 
wholesale  power  market  on  which  the  same  firms  tend  to  be  active  as  on  the  renewable 
electricity market. Market power therefore is probably not an issue on the ROC market. 
On the demand side, the Australian RO differs from most other schemes in that all parties 
who  purchase  electricity  on  the  wholesale  market  (above  a  certain  level)  are  required  to 
purchase renewable energy certificates (RECs). Therefore, in addition to retail companies, large 
electricity users who buy directly from generators also participate in the market. In 2007, a total 
of 65 parties  were required to surrender RECs (ORER 2007 administrative report). On the 
supply side, in December 2007 there were 444 registered individuals and companies who could 
create RECs, ranging from agents who represent owners of solar water heaters to large energy 
generators who own several renewable energy power stations such as hydro and wind. On the 
basis of the information available, there appear to be no cases of anti-competitive behaviour on 
the Australian REC market. 
3.2  Potential for anti-competitive behaviour on a Dutch renewable certificate 
market 
3.2.1  Introduction 
In markets with only a small number of producers and entry barriers to new production, 
anticompetitive behaviour is a potential problem. As argued above, renewable certificate 
markets are characterised by physical constraints due to the limited availability of production 
capacity of renewable electricity. Moreover, investments in renewable energy projects such as 
wind energy have large up-front investment costs, which are to a large extent sunk costs, which 
can also raise entry barriers. And in some renewable certificate markets the number of 
producers is limited. 
In this section, we will consider to what extent a renewable certificate market in the 
Netherlands would be susceptible to anticompetitive behaviour, and how such a market might 
be designed to minimize the risk of this behaviour. Initially, we will consider a market in which 
the RO is placed on retail companies. In section 3.3, other options will be considered such as an 
RO on all electricity purchasers on the wholesale market. 
We first focus on potential market power in the market for production of green certificates 
itself. Then we analyse to what extent market power in this (upstream) market may affect 
market structure in related markets: is there a risk of foreclosure, which would also affect 
competition in related markets of production and retail of electricity. Finally, we consider 
whether collusion may be a problem in such a market.   25 
3.2.2  Market structure and upstream market power 
Any concerns for anticompetitive behaviour will depend on whether individual producers have 
market power. To analyse this we first take a closer look at the current players in this market, as 
well as the potential for new players to enter and the demand side. 
Analysing the market structure of a green certificate market that does not exist poses quite a 
challenge. A possible future certificate market would need time to develop. An analysis of the 
market structure of such a future market therefore has to be based on expected future market 
developments. Currently, renewable electricity is being produced in the Netherlands by a 
number of market parties. This production is subsidized through the MEP-subsidy scheme, 
which lasted from 2003 - 2006. Under this scheme, producers receive a fixed amount of subsidy 
for a period of 10 years, the amount of the subsidy depending on the type of RES-E produced. 
Current RES-E production in the Netherlands is still financed to a large extent by these MEP 
subsidies. MEP subsidies will continue until 2018 for the last installations which were granted a 
license for MEP subsidy in 2006 (and which had start-up times of two years before they started 
operating). 
An important difference between an RO and the MEP is that the MEP-subsidy covered the 
additional costs of most types of RES-E production. Therefore there was no incentive to 
develop the least cost technologies first, as there would have been on a certificate market 
(although within a category, the projects with the lowest cost would have been developed first). 
The structure of current RES-E production might therefore differ from what it would have been 
in the case of an RO with a market for certificates. Nonetheless, information on current RES-E 
production can still provide valuable information on what a green certificate market might look 
like and it can provide a starting point for an assessment of future developments of a market for 
green certificates.  
Figure 3.1 shows quarterly RES-E production for biomass (combustion and cofiring), wind 
onshore and a rest category including water and solar power in the Netherlands in the last 3 
years. Wind shows an increasing trend (corrected for seasonal wind variations), reflecting the 
growth of installed capacity. The steep decline in biomass cofiring can be explained by the 
adjustment of the cofiring tariffs by the Ministry of Economic Affairs on July 1
st 2006, an 
option included within the contracts signed for co-firing subsidies. EZ chose a relatively low 
level, which made cofiring less attractive The subsequent increase of biomass was caused by 
increasing fossil fuel prices and the start of the ETS, which put a price on CO2-emissions from 
fossil fuels. 
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Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of total RES-E production in 2007 (excluding AVI production) 
on the basis of production which was granted MEP-subsidies
8. Biomass co-firing is both the 
largest and, with the exception of power production in waste incinerators (AVIs)
9, the most 
cost-effective option for RES-E generation. Note that the data shown is production data, this 
does not represent total available capacity for cofiring. Wind on shore is the next largest RES-E 
technology, followed by biomass combustion. At the end of 2006, the first off shore wind park 
was completed in the Netherlands (OWEZ / Noordzeewind). In 2008, Q7 (Prinses 
Amaliawindpark) came online, which is expected to produce ca. 435 GWh per year. 
Table 3.1  RES-E production Netherlands 2007 
                         TWh 
         
  2004  2005  2006  2007 
         
Biomass combustion  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.7 
Biomass cofiring  6.0  12.0  10.3  7.8 
Wind onshore  1.9  2.7  3.1  3.8 
Rest (DG/HR/SOL)  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Wind offshore  0  0  0  0.3 
         
Total  8.4  15.2  14.1  12.8 
 
 
8 Except for the data on WOS, which are based on personal communication from ECN.
 
9 In 2005, AVI RES-E production was ca. 1 TWh. It is the least expensive form of RES-E. At current electricity prices of ca. 
[NB currently much lower] € 100 / MWh, AVI RES-E production is profitable and does not need support. RES-E from AVI’s is 
therefore not included in the RO.   27 
In 2007, up to 1400 installations in the Netherlands received MEP subsidy for RES-E. This 
included both small installations, such as solar-PV which produced less than 1 GWh per year 
and wind turbines with an average 2007 production of 4 GWh, and large co-firing power 
stations with an average 2007 production of 366 GWh. 
Figure 3.2 shows the development of the Herfindahl index (HHI), a measure for the level of 
concentration in the market, over time for both total RES-E production and for the individual 
categories, based on the MEP subsidies conferred. Co-firing is highly concentrated, with the 
four largest firms producing around 90% of co-firing renewables production over the years. The 
high concentration level for co-firing has considerable influence on the concentration level for 
the total production of RES-E, given the large share of co-firing in total RES-E production 
(63% in 2007). The high concentration level in the rest category is caused by 2 hydropower 
installations that produce most of the output in this category (which further includes solar-PV). 
With a HHI for total RES-E production between 0.1 and 0.2, the RES-E market in the 
Netherlands is moderately concentrated, while the trend shows a decreasing level of 
concentration. 
These concentration ratios are based on the subsidies received under the MEP. This does not 
include all RES-E produced in the Netherlands, a very small amount is not included (excluding 
AVIs). Furthermore, wind off shore is excluded. Given the limited contribution of offshore 
wind to renewables supply in the Netherlands (less than 10%) and the shared ownership of the 
two offshore wind farms in the Netherlands, in which both established large RES-E producers 
and other firms participate, it is not expected that this will significantly affect the concentration 
ratio for RES-production. 
Another characteristic of current RES-E production in the Netherlands is the high level of 
vertical integration between RES-producers and electricity retail companies. Figure ... shows 
the share in RES-E production which is owned by retail companies in the Netherlands. With an 
overall share of more than 50% and a share of co-firing, the largest and least expensive 
renewable energy source, of around 90%, vertical integration is high. Furthermore, the small 
producers in the competitive fringe often have long-term contracts with the retail companies, 
which further increases vertical integration on the market. 
The concentration ratios presented above do not take into account these long-term contracts 
between small RES-E producers and the vertically integrated retail companies. Therefore, these 
concentration ratios might underestimate the market power of the vertically integrated 
companies if long-term contracts make up an important part of the sale of RES-E. Information 
on the use of current long-term contracts in Dutch RES-E production is limited. 
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Whether the current market structure will change as the market develops and new production 
capacity is constructed, depends on the barriers to entry for new firms. For some technologies 
entry barriers are significant because capacity is physically limited. For biofuel co-firing 
capacity in the short run is limited by the capacity of coal-fired power plants and suitable gas 
fired power plants. New investment in coal-fired generation, which is expected to occur in the 
coming years, may bring new players to the market. Production of onshore wind is limited by 
the availability of suitable sites for wind turbines. Other techniques such as wind at sea, 
biomass combustion or photovoltaic (PV, solar energy) have less restrictive physical 
constraints, but at the moment have considerably higher production costs compared with 
onshore wind or co-firing biomass. However, these costs are expected to fall over time, with 
wind having expected lower costs in 2020 than co-firing. Biomass combustion can be 
considered a backstop technology. Given the availability of (imported) biomass, there is no hard 
constraint on the expansion of biomass combustion. Moreover, new biomass combustion plants 
can be built at short notice, in contrast with wind off shore which may take a long time to 
realise (from planning to production, time spans of 2-7 years are not uncommon). However, 
compared with the other renewables technologies (with the exception of solar PV), biomass 
combustion is the most expensive form of RES-E production. 
   29 
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Figure 3.4 gives the supply curve for renewable in the Netherlands in 2020, showing expected 
costs and expected capacity of the various renewable technologies available in 2020. 
New co-firing capacity will belong to power generators who build power stations capable of 
co-firing, predominantly coal fired power stations. When new co-firing capacity is built by the 
incumbent power producers, this will not have a decreasing effect on the concentration ratio on 
the market for RES-E. If instead new power stations with biomass co-firing capacity are built 
by new firms entering the electricity production market, concentration ratios will be lower. New 
off shore wind parks and biomass combustion plants can be built and operated by other firms 
than the current vertically integrated power companies, which would further diminish 
concentration on the supply side of the certificate market. 
Given the current trend towards less concentration in the market and the importance of 
technologies such as wind onshore and offshore which do not necessarily have to be operated 
by the current power producers and the relative absence of barriers to entry for these 
technologies, it might be expected that the concentration in the market will further diminish in 
the years to come. New cofiring capacity is more likely to belong to incumbent producers, it is 
however expected that cofiring will constitute at most one third of new RES-E capacity. 
Another determinant of market power in the green certificate production market is the 
elasticity of supply and demand: how does the supply of certificates vary in response to rising 
prices, and how does demand adapt? If the response to higher prices on the demand or the 
supply side of the market is weak, producers are not restricted in raising prices significantly 
above costs. The long-run elasticity of supply is related to the barriers of entry. If prices remain 
higher for long periods, suppliers with lower average cost will only enter the market insofar as    30 

























there are no physical capacity constraints. In the short run, the elasticity of supply given the 
available installed capacity will be determined by the marginal costs of production: do short-run 
higher prices provoke higher production of green electricity? For intermittent resources such as 
wind energy, the marginal costs are typically very low: these technologies will always produce 
when available, and therefore will not exhibit significant price response. The situation is 
different for in particular biomass co-firing, where both the costs of the fuel itself, and the 
opportunity costs of reduced output when replacing coal with biomass, create responsiveness to 
certificate prices, as long as there is still capacity available for co-firing. 
Supply elasticity might be substantially higher if imports of green certificates would be 
allowed. International markets for green certificates are the subject of chapter 6. 
On the demand side, price responsiveness will depend on the mechanism that determines the 
requirement for green certificates. As long as demand for certificates is fixed in absolute terms 
by the government, demand will obviously be unresponsive. If on the other hand the 
requirement for certificates is a fixed fraction of the demand for electricity, a higher price for 
certificates will result in a higher price for electricity. This derived effect on electricity prices, 
will result in some price responsiveness . Price elasticity for electricity is generally assumed to 
be low, but not negligible in particular in the longer term. Moreover, elasticity is largest for 
industrial users. When the RO applies only to retail companies, demand elasticity for 
certificates will be lower, which may aggravate any problems with market power. 
Elasticity both on supply and demand side will also depend on the timing of the markets. 
Longer time frames for meeting certificate requirements enable both producers and consumers 
to respond more elastically to price changes. In most green certificate systems implemented so 
far, the commitment period is one year. The possibility to bank certificates for use in another   31 
commitment period will increase supply elasticity because RES-E producers will have more 
flexibility. 
Concluding, the current concentration rate in the production of RES in the Netherlands is 
moderate and there is a downward trend. If this trend continues, market power on a future 
renewable certificate market in the Netherlands will not be an issue. The technologies which are 
expected to play an important role in the years to come such as wind on shore and offshore do 
not necessarily have to be owned by the established RES-E producers.  
However, there is the possibility that market power might be an issue in a number of cases. 
The downward trend might be reversed, for example if wind off shore would primarily be 
owned by incumbent producers. Another reason is the occurrence of exclusive contracts 
between producers and retail companies. In the next sections we will discuss two forms of anti-
competitive behaviour that might occur if market power would occur for one of these reasons. 
3.3  Collusion 
Wholesale producers of renewable energy may form a cartel, either on the market for green 
certificates, or on the retail market between vertically integrated suppliers of electricity. A 
relevant question, therefore, is whether the new market increases the probability of cartel 
formation?  
Factors facilitating collusion are: the number of firms in the market, asymmetry in market 
share, entry barriers, frequent interaction, market transparency, (predictable) demand growth 
and multi-market contracts. Unpredictable fluctuations in demand, innovative markets, cost 
asymmetries and buyer power hinder collusion. 
A number of factors favouring collusion occur on the certificate market. Although the 
market concentration on the current RES-E market is moderate, as described above, the 
possibility of long-term contracts between independent RES-E producers and the distribution 
companies might be conducive to collusion. Moreover, the entry barriers for the least cost 
technologies such as co-firing because of the physical limitations might also contribute to 
collusion. 
Producers of green electricity are highly integrated with the distribution companies which 
sell electricity on the retail market (see above ...). This increases interaction, which again 
facilitates collusion. Moreover, it provides the opportunity to collude both in the green 
certificate market and the electricity retail market, which increases the likelihood of collusion. 
Last, demand for green certificates will be highly predictable, because future renewables 
obligations, which are set by the government, drive the demand for certificates. 
Some arguments also relate the high level of vertical integration in the industry to increased 
potential for collusion (Riordan, 2005). Defection in the upstream certificates market can be 
more swiftly punished by easy renegotiation of downstream contracts. Through the downstream 
business’s contacts with other producers, agreements may be more easily reached and   32 
monitored. Against collusion speaks the argument that integration secures part of the 
downstream sales, making punishment after defection less effective.  
Introduction of an RO might increase the likelihood of collusion on the electricity market, 
provided that there is market power on the certificate market. However, conclusions on the 
possible occurrence of collusion on a future market remain highly speculative and should be 
treated with due reservation. Moreover, collusion is not allowed under the competition law and 
therefore would be prohibited and penalised if discovered. 
3.4  Foreclosure 
Wholesale producers may try to foreclose upstream or downstream competitors. To analyse this 
aspect note that in the base case where it is the retailers that are required to buy certificates, we 
have, on the upstream side, two complementary markets: green certificates and electricity. In 
order to be active downstream, retailers have to purchase upstream input. Some certificate 
producers will also produce electricity, but other electricity producers will not produce 
certificates. Certificates are an essential input in selling to retail consumers. This may give rise 
to concerns that dominant producers in the certificate market may extend their market power to 
the related retail market, or the market for non-renewable energy.  
There are two types of foreclosure we consider. First, on the upstream level there may be the 
potential for horizontal foreclosure (tying or bundling), where certificate producers put their 
grey rivals at a disadvantage by only selling their certificates together with the electricity, or 
more generally to reduce competitiveness of other electricity providers. 
Second, there may be vertical foreclosure on the downstream market. Vertical foreclosure 
comes in two forms. On the one hand, input foreclosure exists where the certificate producers 
deny certificates to some retailers, forcing them to be inactive or less competitive. On the other 
hand customer foreclosure might occur where a particular certificate producer enters into 
exclusive contracts with downstream retail producers, foreclosing other producers from access 
to these potential customers. Certificate producers are often active on the downstream retail 
market, and hence are vertically integrated. Renewable energy producers have a preference for 
long-term contracts in order to minimise risks and to have access to external finance. Vertical 
foreclosure is therefore a potential concern in these markets. 
Theory shows that the anticompetitive goals of the two types of foreclosure are distinct 
(Bijlsma et al. 2008). Horizontal foreclosure may be profitable if it achieves making the market 
for grey electricity less competitive. The goals of vertical foreclosure may either be to prevent 
the erosion of market power in the certificate market, or to prevent or hinder entry by other 
green certificate producers, or to alter the market structure in supply in adjacent markets (e.g. 
supply to large customers).   33 
3.4.1  Vertical foreclosure 
To identify whether vertical foreclosure is indeed a risk, we apply the policy framework 
developed in Bijlsma et al (2008), which consists of three steps. First, determine whether 
vertical foreclosure might occur. Second, identify the theory of anticompetitive foreclosure. 
Third, Identify possible welfare enhancing efficiencies that arise from vertical integration 
 
Market power 
As regards the first step, we start from the presumption that market power exists in the 
production of renewable energy. If there is no market power in a potential market for green 
certificates, there will be no reason to worry about foreclosure or about other anticompetitive 
effects. 
 
Theory of anticompetitive foreclosure 
From the description above, we conclude that a market for renewable energy certificates will 
probably have the following characteristics: 
 
•  The good in question (renewable certificates) is tradable and homogeneous. This implies that if 
trade occurs or is allowed, there will be little scope for price discrimination (firms will pay 
similar unit prices). Non linear contracts (for example quantity discounts) will allow market 
participants to engage in profitable arbitrage by reselling certificates to other market players. 
•  Scale effects will not be an issue for some specific technologies such as onshore wind, solar PV 
and solar water heating. However, for co-firing of biomass and wind offshore, scale effects 
probably will be important. 
•  There are production constraints for both green certificates and electricity. 
For green certificates there are constraints on the production of specific technologies such as 
wind on land, biomass co-firing, which limits the production of especially the lowest-cost 
technologies. For high cost production technologies, such as wind on land, solar PV and solar 
water heating, production constraints play a less important role. 
•  The upstream market for production of grey electricity is oligopolistic. The upstream market for 
certificates is more competitive, but long-term contracts with downstream retailers could reduce 
competition in the upstream certificate market.  
•  The downstream market for electricity is potentially competitive. 
•  Upstream producers and downstream retailers are to a large extent vertically integrated, which 
might be increased by long-term contracts between independent RES-E producers and 
downstream retailers. 
 
Based on this list of characteristics, we can identify three potentially relevant theories of 
foreclosure in this market. First, foreclosure of (downstream) retailers may arise if downstream 
competition leads to erosion of the oligopoly profits on the upstream green certificate   34 
production: supplying many retailers might expose the producer to risk of overselling the 
market (see Hart and Tirole, 1990) The fact that contracts, if offered to multiple retailers, are 
restricted to consist only of a (volume independent) price (since the retailers can arbitrage any 
lump sum prices by trading among each other) suggests that exclusive contracts or no supply at 
all to non-affiliated retailers(and thus foreclosure) may constitute an equilibrium (see 
Mathewson and Winters, 1990). 
Second, if scale effects make a minimum scale of operation in the (green) production market 
necessary, a firm can enter into exclusive contracts with a critical number of downstream firms 
(‘buyers’), depriving a potential entrant of the minimum scale necessary to enter the upstream 
market, see Rasmussen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). Entry can be deterred 
profitably, because not all the buyers have to be bribed into signing a contract. 
Third, if scale effects exist in the retail market, green producers might try to limit operations 
of rival retailers in the residential market (where green certificates are required) so as to make 
them less competitive in the related market of supply to large users (where certificates do not 
play a role). In the mirror image of the previous scenario, downstream firms enter into exclusive 
contracts with a critical number of upstream firms. 
The potential foreclosure effect of exclusive contracts suggests that these should be treated 
with caution in a market for renewable energy certificates. If on the other hand the certificate 
market develops into a competitive market, there should be no concerns for foreclosure. 
Exclusive contracts may also increase efficiency. In the next section, we therefore investigate 
the efficiency increasing potential of these contracts.  
 
Possible welfare enhancing efficiencies that arise from vertical integration 
In theory, several welfare enhancing effects exist that may arise as a consequence of vertical 
integration or exclusive contracts. 
First, welfare reducing double mark-ups may exist, which can be resolved by vertically 
integrating or other vertical restraints. In principle, we might expect double mark-ups to exist if 
there is market power in both markets. However, we expect that the retail market is fairly 
competitive. This implies that double-mark-up problems will be limited if the retailers are 
required to buy such contracts. 
Second, in general, exclusive contracts or vertical integration can stimulate relation specific 
investments, which may enhance efficiency. For such investments, firms could behave 
opportunistically ex post, i.e., once an investment has been made. Exclusive contracts and 
vertical integration can mitigate such opportunistic behaviour. However, investments in 
production capacity for renewable energy is not relation specific. The energy generated can be 
sold to anybody.  
In conclusion, it is unlikely that exclusive contracts have large efficiency effects in a market 
for renewable energy certificates. 
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3.4.2  Horizontal foreclosure 
Horizontal foreclosure may arise when a monopolist producer in the one market (market A) can 
leverage its market power to another market (market B, which is competitive and where the 
monopolist has an affiliate) by tying or bundling its product in market A to its product in market 
B. The famous Microsoft case is a well-known example of (alleged) horizontal; see e.g. 
Whinston (2001). In the context of a market for renewable energy certificates, horizontal 
foreclosure would amount to a producer of such certificates to tie or bundle certificates to the 
sales of electricity.  
As in many cases of alleged abuse of monopoly power, a Chicago critique applies, which 
states that, absent efficiencies, a monopolist will not benefit from tying the products in the two 
markets.
10 In response, economists have identified circumstances under which tying may be 
profitable for anticompetitive reasons, see e.g. Rey and Tirole (2005). As argued by Whinston 
(2001), there are “two features that are central to all of these models: 1) the monopolized 
product is not essential for all uses of the complementary good; and 2) scale economies (or 
network effects) are present in the complementary good.” This leads to three requirements for 
tying to be (potentially) anticompetitive: 
 
1.  A commitment to tying must be possible; 
2.  There should exist economies of scale; 
3.  The goods in the different markets should not be full complements, but must be independent to 
some extent. 
 
Whether these conditions hold in a potential market for renewable energy certificates is 
questionable. On the one hand, since only supply to retailers requires certificates, the 
complementary good (electricity) can well be sold without the certificate, in the related large 
user market, making the last conditions easier to satisfy. On the other hand, it seems fairly 
difficult for the green producers to commit to not selling to the (wholesale) market for 
electricity, in particular if the production capacity of green producers is larger than the small 
and medium sized users’ market supplied by retailers. In addition, the presence of scale effects 
in generation is likely to become of decreasing importance as viable scale of generation 
facilities goes down (in particular for distributed generation). Therefore, the first and second 
conditions seem not to be met if current developments proceed as projected. Horizontal 
foreclosure seems to be less likely, therefore. 
 
10 Assume production costs in market A(B) are CA(B). The price for the tied product can never exceed the total value 
consumers V attach to the two products separately. Monopoly profit therefore equals V-CA-CB. If the products are not tied, 
the maximum price the monopolist can charge equals this total value minus the competitive price CB in the B-market. The 
monopolist’s profits again are V-CA-CB.   36 
3.5  Other scenarios 
Other scenarios change our characterization of the market and its potential for vertical and 
horizontal foreclosure. If the renewable obligation is put elsewhere, e.g. on all purchasers on the 
wholesale market instead of on retail companies, the market structure will change and one 
might regard all electricity purchasers as the downstream market while production of 
certificates is the upstream market. The downstream market will be less concentrated, moreover 
vertical integration will be considerably reduced. Therefore, the likelihood of anticompetitive 
behaviour will be reduced and foreclosure less likely. 
The focus in this study is on a potential market for renewable certificates in the Netherlands. 
An RO however could also extend over more than one country. This would add both producers 
of RES-E and buyers of certificates to the market. In the standard RO case, extending the 
scheme to include parties from other countries in addition to the Netherlands would further 
reduce the likelihood of anticompetitive behaviour and of foreclosure. 
3.6  Conclusions 
If the current developments on the Dutch RES-E market continue, market power on a future 
renewable certificate market in the Netherlands will probably not be an issue. The current 
concentration rate is moderate and there is a downward trend. Moreover, the technologies 
which are expected to play an important role in the years to come such as wind off shore and on 
shore, do not necessarily have to be owned by the established RES-E producers. New cofiring 
capacity is more likely to be developed by incumbent producers, however the expected share of 
new cofiring capacity is expected to be less than one third of total new capacity. 
Market power on the RES-E market might be a problem if extensive use will be made of 
long-term exclusive contracts for the sale of certificates. It is difficult to predict the extent to 
which these long-terms contracts would be employed on a future certificate market in the 
Netherlands. If this would be the case, anti-competitive behaviour such as collusion or 
foreclosure might in theory be a problem. 
As regards vertical foreclosure it is unlikely that exclusive long-term contracts have large 
efficiency effects in a market for renewable energy certificates. Horizontal foreclosure is not 
likely to occur on the market, given the increasing potential for decentralised generation and 
therefore reduced economies of scale in electricity production and the possibility of selling 
electricity on the wholesale market to other electricity purchasers than the retail companies. 
Extending the obligation to all purchasers on the wholesale market would reduce the likelihood 
for anti-competitive behaviour.   37 
4  Distributional consequences of RO and subsidies 
Implementing a renewables obligation or a subsidy will have consequences for producers of 
both renewable and grey electricity and for consumers. When a renewable obligation is 
introduced, consumers will face higher costs because of the renewable certificates
11. This will 
have an effect on the price and demand for electricity. Equilibrium on the electricity market will 
be affected, which has consequences for both consumers and producers. The consequences for 
consumers can be measured by the consumer surplus, which is the amount that consumers 
benefit by being able to purchase a product for a price that is less than they would be willing to 
pay. Producer surplus is the equivalent measure for producer benefit
12. Introducing a 
renewables obligation will also have an effect on producers of RES-E, who can sell both 
electricity and their renewables certificates and realise a producer surplus on both markets. 
Comparing the effects on producer and consumer surplus of introducing a support scheme will 
show the distributional impact on producers of both green and grey electricity and consumers. 
In the next section, the effects on the electricity market and on producer and consumer surplus 
of introducing a renewables obligation or a subsidy are outlined. Subsequently, an estimate is 
given of the quantitative impact of a renewables obligation on the Dutch electricity market and 
on producer and consumer surplus. This will be compared with the impact of a feed-in tariff 
such as the SDE. 
4.1  Price and volume effects of renewable certificates and subsidies 
Renewable obligation 
Introduction of a renewables obligation and the appearance of a renewable certificate market 
will have consequences for the electricity market. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1. With a 
renewable obligation, electricity retailers will have to acquire renewable certificates, which will 
raise their costs. Passing on these costs to their customers will drive a wedge between the 
wholesale price of electricity and the price which consumers have to pay. This can be shown as 
a downward shift of the demand curve, equal to the price of the green certificates, from curve D 
to D’ (which is equivalent to an upward shift of the supply curve). As a result of this higher 
price, demand for electricity will fall from X0 to X1, which will lower the wholesale price of 
electricity from P0 to PW. Consumers will pay retail price P1, with the difference between the 
wholesale price PW and the retail price P1 being determined by the certificate price and the share 
of the RO in final electricity demand. In addition, because of the RO, electricity generated from 
fossil fuel will be replaced by RES-E. This will further reduce supply of grey electricity and  
 
11 For small consumers, retailers will have to acquire renewable certificates to fulfil their obligation. They will pass on these 
costs to their consumers.  
12 Producer surplus will be passed on to, for example, the owners of inputs such as labour and capital.   38 
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therefore further lower the wholesale price (for the sake of simplicity, this has been omitted in 
Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.2 shows the consequences for producer and consumer surplus. The loss in CS 
equals the surface under the demand curve between p1 and p0, the light grey shaded area. The 
dark grey shaded area is the loss of producer surplus. Only part of the loss in consumer and 
producer surplus represents a loss to society as a whole, a loss which will ideally be less than 
the benefits of using more renewables such a, for example, reduced CO2 emissions. For the 
other part the loss in consumer and producer surplus is a transfer to the producers of green 
electricity, covering both their costs and the producer surplus they acquire on the certificate 
market. 
Introduction of an RO raises the retail electricity price (including the costs of the RO) paid 
by consumers. The extent to which the retail price will increase depends on the elasticity of the 
supply curves of both RES-E and fossil fuel generated electricity. The increase will be lower the 
more elastic is the supply of RES-E and the more inelastic is the supply of non-renewable 
electricity. With an elastic supply of RES-E, the costs of an increase in the RO are relatively 
small, therefore the effect on the retail electricity price will also be limited. With an inelastic 
supply of non-renewable electricity, a decrease in the consumption of non-renewable electricity 
will cause a larger drop in the wholesale price of electricity. 
In the longer run, the effects of introducing an RO will be less pronounced because supply 
(RES-E as well as non-renewable electricity) can adjust to the new situation. In the short run, 
the introduction of an RO will create excess electricity generating capacity, which will lower 
the wholesale price of electricity. In the longer run, when the necessary RO capacity has been 
installed and grey electricity capacity has been adjusted to the new situation, the wholesale   39 
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price might increase (Amundson and Mortensen 2001). Loss of PS for fossil fuel based 
electricity production will therefore be smaller in the long-run. 
So far, the effects of introducing an RO on prices and volumes have been addressed without 
taking into account the possibility of import and export of electricity. However, the Dutch 
electricity market is linked to markets in neighbouring countries. This will have consequences 
for the effects which the introduction of an RO will have on the electricity market. The effect on 
the wholesale price in a Northwest European electricity market of introducing an RO in the 
Netherlands will be more limited, compared with the effects on an electricity market which is 
not linked to other countries. There will be changes in import and export, with less import or 
more export of non-renewable electricity. Given the more limited effect on wholesale prices 
with a wider electricity market, producer surplus of fossil fuel based electricity generators will 
be less affected compared with a national electricity market which is not connected to other 
electricity markets in neighbouring countries. 
Subsidy 
The effect of a subsidy for green electricity on the electricity market will depend on the way in 
which the subsidy is funded. If the subsidy is funded through a surcharge on the electricity 
price, the effects will be similar to those of an RO scheme. The electricity price for consumers 
will increase, which reduces demand. This reduces the wholesale price, which will further 
decline because of the additional supply of RES-E with low marginal costs, which shifts the 
supply curve of fossil fuel generated electricity to the right. The size of the effects will be 
smaller compared with an RO scheme, because an RO scheme entails larger transfers to RES-E 
producers, see the next section on producers surplus for RES-E producers.   40 
In case the subsidy is not funded through a surcharge on the electricity price, there is no direct 
effect on electricity prices. What remains is an increased supply of RES-E, which will lower the 
wholesale price and therefore induce an increase in electricity use. 
Producer surplus for RES-E producers 
On a certificate market, all RES-E producers will get the same price for the certificates 
produced. This is regardless of the technology they use. Consequently, low-cost producers of 
renewable energy, such as cofiring, will receive a high producer surplus if the RO level is such 
that the costs of the marginal producer of certificates and therefore the price is high. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.3. If the RO is set at such a level that the most expensive technology will 
have to be used, the certificate price will be based upon the marginal costs of biomass import, 
ca. € 170 per MWh. The least expensive option to produce RES-E, wind-on-shore, will make a 
profit of ca. € 90 per MWh produced. Total producer surplus on the certificate market equals 
the area above the marginal cost curve under the € 170. 

























In an ideal subsidy scheme, the tariffs are set in such a way that producers will only make a 
reasonable profit on their investments. This realised through a technology-specific subsidy 
based on the additional costs for each technology. Consequently, there is no producer surplus, 
assuming that the subsidy is set at the right level.
13 
RO can have considerable distributional consequences, depending on the stringency of the 
renewables target and renewable technologies available. The transfer from consumers and 
 
13 Note that producers which can produce at lower costs than assumed in setting the subsidy for a specific technology will 
realise a higher profit.   41 
producers of grey electricity to producers of RES-E will be larger the more stringent the target 
is and the large cost differences are. This transfer, and the potential large profuts for intra-
marginal producers of RES-E has encouraged policymakers to look for options to minimise 
these transfers within an RO scheme. An example of such an option is the banding approach in 
the UK RO which was introduced as of 1st April 2009. In this banding scheme, technologies are 
given a number of certificates which varies between 1 and 2 per MWh, depending on the costs 
of production (Department of Energy and Climate Change 2008). 
In such an approach, the regulator has to specify the number of certificates for each 
technology (or group of technologies). This should be based on the cost difference with the least 
cost RES-E technology. For example, a technology with additional costs which are twice the 
additional costs of the least cost technology should receive two certificates per MWh if the least 
cost technology receives 1 certificate per MWh. This ratio is based on the additional costs of 
RES-E compared with grey power production. These additional costs however are not fixed. 
Changing fuel costs will affect the production costs of grey power and therefore the additional 
costs of RES-E. And with changes in the additional costs, the ratio between the additional costs 
will change as well. Therefore, a ratio set in advance will not reflect cost differences if fuel 
prices change. This will affect the profitability of different technologies and therefore the 
certificate price. Total costs of realising the RES-E target therefore will increase. 
Comparable options are to combine an RO with subsidies for the more expensive 
technologies or to set specific obligations for each technology, thereby creating separate 
markets for certificates from each technology. These options have in common with banding that 
they reduce the certificate price, the loss of consumer surplus and the producer surplus for RES-
E producers 
A major drawback of these options is that the authorities have to acquire detailed 
information about the costs of specific technologies, as is the case with a subsidy. One of the 
major advantages of a certificate market is that the market generates this information, which 
will be reflected in the market price. This advantage is nullified with these variants. They 
combine the drawbacks of a certificate market, such as higher transaction costs, with the higher 
administrative costs of a subsidy scheme. 
Moreover, there is no incentive for RES-E developers to prefer the least cost technologies, 
because the additional costs of all technologies, regardless of their cost level, will be covered by 
the scheme. Consequently, the actual investments will not necessary reflect the merit order of 
renewable technology options and therefore the costs of meeting the RO will probably be 
higher. 
Given the major drawbacks of these options, we will not further consider them in this study.    42 
4.2  Quantitative assessment 
In this section, the effects of introducing an RO and a premium subsidy in the Netherlands on 
electricity prices, consumers and producers which have been outlined in the former section are 
analysed by performing a number of model simulations. The model used for these simulations 
is the COMPETES electricity market simulation model from ECN. The COMPETES model has 
been developed by ECN to simulate competition on the Northwest European electricity market. 
Using COMPETES therefore includes the effects on price changes from import and export of 
electricity, as has been described in section 4.1. 
Various market structures can be simulated with COMPETES, ranging from perfect 
competition to oligopolistic market structures. In this study, it is assumed that there is a 
liberalised, competitive electricity market in Northwest Europe in the target year 2020 (see 
Ozdemir et. al. 2008). Demand in COMPETES is distinguished for three seasons (winter, 
summer and autumn) and four time periods (super peak, peak, shoulder and off-peak), yielding 
12 different levels of demand. For a detailed description of COMPETES, see the COMPETES 
page on the ECN website (ECN, 2009). 
In addition to the baseline scenario, both the introduction of an RO and a premium subsidy 
such as the SDE are simulated. Two renewable targets are analysed, 20% and 30% of final 
electricity demand. These targets are rough approximations of the amount of RES-E needed to 
meet the renewable energy targets as a share of total energy demand as formulated by the EU 
and the Dutch government in its climate and energy action plan. The 20% RES-E target reflects 
the EU target for renewable energy (14% of final demand), the 30% target reflects the Dutch 
target of 20% of primary energy use. 
4.2.1  Baseline scenario 
In order to determine the effects of introducing an RO, a baseline scenario has to be chosen 
against which the effects can be measured. The baseline scenario used here is derived from the 
so-called High Demand Growth-High investments (Coal dominating) scenario from the Future 
Electricity Prices study (ECN 2008). For the Netherlands, this scenario is based on the Global 
Economy High Oil Price (GEHP) scenario. This scenario is defined in the ‘Welvaart en 
leefomgeving’ study by CPB, MNP, ECN and RPB (WLO) and has been used as the 
background scenario for recent energy and climate policies such as the ‘Schoon en Zuinig’ 
programme of the Dutch government. 
For other countries in the Northwest European market (i.e. Germany, Belgium, France and the 
United Kingdom) comparable country specific scenarios are used in combination with PRIMES 
scenarios that were developed as reference projections for the European Commission (EC, 
2006). 
The ‘high oil’ price in GEHP was assumed to be ca. $40 per barrel in 2040 (in $2000). The 
price for natural gas in 2020 in line with this oil price assumption is €6.82/GJ (€2000), the price   43 
for coal is €2.5/GJ. Prices in the other countries are comparable, the only difference are higher 
gas prices in Belgium and the UK and higher coal prices in Germany. The price for CO2 
allowances is set at €20/ton. 
Electricity demand growth in the Netherlands in the baseline scenario is high, 2.1% per year, 
resulting in a final demand in 2020 of 155 TWh (as compared to 116 TWh in 2006). Demand 
growth in the other countries is based on the background scenarios for these countries. The 
price elasticity of demand, which determines the change in demand resulting from price 
changes in the policy scenarios relative to the price in the baseline is set at -0.2.  
Investments in new capacity is based on the current plans for new plants and on the growth in 
peak demand. In the baseline used here, new capacity installed consists of coal and gas-fired 
plants.  
In addition to new investments, there will also be plants decommissioned in the period 
considered here. Decommissioning of existing capacity is based on IEA data, for the 
Netherlands it is expected that 2.3 GW of old coal capacity will be decommissioned in 2020.  
Interconnection capacity is expected to increase according to current plans. For the Netherlands, 
these include a connection with Norway (Norned), the U.K. (BritNed) and an extension of the 
interconnection capacity with Germany. 
The High Demand Growth-High investments scenario from the future electricity price study 
includes significant increases in renewable capacity in the period 2006-2020, implicitly 
assuming there is a policy to stimulate the development of renewable energy. In order to be able 
to assess the impact of introducing an RO, it has been assumed in the baseline used here that no 
new renewable energy capacity will be installed. Consequently, in 2020 RES-E is only 
produced by plants already operating in 2006 (mainly wind and biomass), which adds up to 2.2 
percent of total electricity consumption. 
4.2.2  Renewable obligation scenarios 
Two different RO are examined, one in which the RO is set at 20% of electricity consumption 
in 2020 and another with a renewable target of 30%. Table 4.1 lists the options available in 
2020 and the long run marginal costs of these options. It is assumed that the RO has to be met 
from renewable energy sources within the Netherlands, import of green certificates is not 
allowed. The certificate price will be determined by the marginal technology which is needed to 
meet the level of the RO. 
Wind is expected to be the most inexpensive option in 2020. Biomass cofiring in coal fired 
power plants is slightly more expensive, given the assumptions made about the costs of 
biomass. Biomass import for use in stand-alone biomass plants is the most expensive option and 
is regarded as backstop technology which has sufficient potential to meet the renewable targets. 
It should be noted that solar PV is not included. Given the still high costs of solar which are 
expected for 2020, solar-PV will not be an attractive option in a renewables market.   44 
It is assumed that renewable technologies bid low in the wholesale market, reflecting the low or 
zero short run marginal costs of renewable technologies, and therefore operate as base load 
units. 
Table 4.1  Renewable technologies potential Netherlands 2020 
  Long-run marginal cost €/MWh  Potential new capacity TWh 
     
Wind onshore  80  7.2 
Wind offshore  105  16.5 
Biomass cofiring  113  12.2 
Biomass combustion  140  1.5 
Biomass digestion  160  2.9 
Biomass import  170   
 
In the simulations, it is assumed that the costs of the renewable obligation are born by all 
electricity consumers. In terms of the design options of an RO, this is equivalent to assuming 
that the RO applies to all electricity demand, both small-scale power users and large industrial 
consumers. The cost increase is equal to the certificate price times the share of the obligation.  
In Table 4.2, the effects on the electricity market in the Netherlands of the introduction of an 
RO (both 20% and 30% share of electricity use) are shown. The base load price will fall slightly 
in the 20% RO scenario, reflecting the effect of a shift in the merit order because of the increase 
in production of RES-E. However, the effect is small because the electricity markets of 
Northwest Europe are integrated to a large extent. The simulations show that the introduction of 
an RO in the Netherlands also leads to a small decrease in the base load wholesale price in 
Germany. 
Table 4.2  RO scenario results 2020 
  Baseline scenario  20% RO  30% RO 
       
Base load wholesale price Netherlands (€/MWh)  56  54  54 
Certificate price (€/MWh)  −   56  104 
Retail price (€/MWh)  56  65  84 
Electricity consumption (TWh)  155  150  140 
Increase in renewables production
a (TWh)  −   26.5  38.4 
Decrease in grey production
a (TWh)  −   29.2  45.6 
Reduced import (TWh)    3  6  
        a
Compared to baseline 
Source: COMPETES 
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In the 20% RO scenario, the increase in renewable production consists mainly of wind (both on 
shore and off shore) and, at the margin, a limited amount of cofiring, which sets the certificate 
price
14. Production of grey electricity is reduced with 29.2 TWh, a reduction of 22% compared 
to baseline grey power production. Import is also reduced, by 3 TWh.
15 
In the 30% RO scenario significantly more expensive renewables capacity need to be installed 
in order to meet the higher obligation. The effect on the base load wholesale price is still 
limited, about 1 euro per MWh less, as is to be expected on an integrated Northwest European 
market. 
The price for certificates is almost double the price in the 20% RO scenario, at € 104 per 
MWh. In addition to wind, biomass cofiring is used on a large scale and the full potential of 
biomass combustion capacity is installed. At the margin, 1.5 TWh of biomass digestion is being 
produced. 
With the higher certificate price and the higher obligation, the retail price in the Netherlands 
increases to 84 € / MWh, an increase of 50%. In response, electricity demand falls to 140 TWh, 
a decrease of 10%. With the lower demand and the increase in renewables, grey production falls 
with 45,6 TWh. 
Table 4.3  RO scenarios and surplus in 2020 
       20%      30% 
             


















             
Producer surplus grey electricity    − 470  − 31    − 562  − 37 
Producers surplus renewables  681  502    2515  2335   
Consumer surplus    − 1379  − 6    − 4127  − 19 
             
Source: COMPETES 
 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the RO scenarios for both producer and consumer surplus in 
2020 (excluding investment costs for grey production). Producers of grey energy will see 
demand for their product decline for two reasons. First, the production of the obligatory share of 
RES-E replaces grey electricity. Second, the reduction in demand due to the increase in the 
retail price reduces electricity use. In the 20% RO scenario, grey producers lose 31% of their 
producer surplus, compared with the baseline scenario, a decrease of € 470 million. In contrast, 
renewable producers will see their surplus increase with € 516 million to € 681 million. This 
surplus is made up of the producer surplus on the certificate market and a surplus realised on 
 
14 The certificate price and wholesale price do not add up exactly to the costs of the marginal renewable technology. 
15 In the baseline scenario, the Netherlands import electricity. This is a result of the baseline assumptions, in which there is 
no new renewable capacity installed in addition to installed capacity in 2006.   46 
the electricity market by the renewable capacity already installed in 2006, which is assumed to 
have been paid off. Combined, grey and renewable power producers will see a slight increase in 
producer surplus. 
Consumer surplus falls with 6% relative to the baseline scenario, a loss of € 1.4 billion. The 
loss in consumer surplus consists of a transfer to RES-E producers in order to pay for the total 
additional costs of renewables (producer surplus and the additional costs of renewables 
compared to grey power production) and of a deadweight loss because of reduced demand. 
The total value of the green certificate market is € 1.7 billion, which is made up of a producer 
surplus on the certificate market of € 0.5 billion (including the surplus realised by selling 
certificates from the renewable capacity installed already in the baseline scenario) and the costs 
of producing the certificates (the additional costs given the revenue earned on the electricity 
produced) of € 1.2 billion. 
In the 30% RO, the effects are considerably more pronounced, due to the high costs of 
producing the additional 10% of RES-E compared with the 20% RO. Producers of grey 
electricity will see their surplus reduced by 37%, an increase with almost € 92 million compared 
with the 20% RO. RES-E producer surplus rises with a factor of more than 4 in comparison 
with the 20% obligation, reaching € 2515 million in 2020. This is due to the high price caused 
by the high-cost marginal technology, biomass digestion, which substantially increases the 
intramarginal rents of the less expensive options such as wind and biomass cofiring. Consumers 
lose 19% of their consumer surplus, relative to the baseline, or € 4.1 billion. 
The total value of the green certificate market is € 4.3 billion, which consists of a producer 
surplus on the certificate market of € 2.3 billion (including the surplus realised by selling 
certificates from renewable capacity installed in the baseline scenario) and the costs of 
producing the certificates (the additional costs given the revenue earned on the electricity 
produced) of € 2 billion. 
The increase in the RO from 20% to 30% has a profound effect on the distributional 
consequences of introducing an RO. Given the barriers which limit the more cost-effective 
options, the high cost of the marginal technology drives up the certificates price, which 
generates a large producer surplus for the less expensive, intramarginal technologies. 
4.2.3  Premium subsidy 
Instead of RO, a feed-in tariff or premium subsidy such as the SDE could be used to realise the 
20% or 30% renewables target. Here, a premium subsidy comparable to the SDE is simulated 
with the same baseline scenario as the RO simulations. The SDE is funded from the government 
budget and therefore the subsidy is not reflected in the electricity price. Consequently, power 
consumption will only be affected by the inclusion of RES-E in electricity production in so far 
as it affects the merit order. This will have an impact (although limited, given the integrated 
Northwest European power market) on electricity prices.   47 
Table 4.4 gives the results for the premium subsidy. The electricity price falls slightly, 
reflecting the higher share of renewables with very low marginal costs in the energy mix for 
power generation. The retail price does not include a component for the funding of renewables 
and therefore equals the wholesale price. Power consumption therefore shows a small increase 
because of the lower electricity price. This is in contrast with the RO simulations, where 
electricity consumption has declined because of the higher retail price. In the 30% renewables 
simulations, electricity consumption is 17 TWh higher under the premium subsidy, compared 
with the RO. Consequently, RES-E production will be higher, given the percentage target, 1.2 
TWh more in the 20% RES-E share simulations for the premium subsidy compared with the 
RO and 5 TWh more in the 30% RES-E share simulations. In the 30% RES-E share scenario, 
the increase in green production necessitates the import of biomass for combustion in stand 
alone biomass-fired power plants, the most expensive form of renewables. 
Table 4.4  Premium subsidy scenario results 2020 
  Baseline scenario  20% RES-E share  30% RES-E share 
       
Base load wholesale price Netherlands (€/MWh)  55.9  54.1  53.2 
Retail price (€/MWh)                                 idem wholesale price  
       
Electricity consumption (TWh)  155  156  157 
Increase in renewables production
a (TWh)  −   27.7  43.4 
Decrease in grey production
a (TWh)  −   24.8  38.1 
        a
Compared to baseline 
Source: COMPETES 
 
It has been assumed that the level of subsidy provided exactly reflects the additional costs of 
each renewable technology. In reality, these costs are not known with certainty by the 
regulators. Therefore, costs might be higher than in the optimal case presented here. 
Table 4.5  premium subsidy scenarios surplus and subsidy in 2020 
        20%        30% 


















             
Producer surplus grey electricity    − 444  -29    − 524  − 35 
Subsidy to RES-E producers  1257  −   −   2587     
Consumer surplus    286  1%    422  2% 
             
Source: COMPETES 
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The losses in grey producer surplus under the premium subsidy are comparable to those in the 
RO simulations, see Table 4.5. Producer surplus loss is somewhat lower, due to the higher 
demand for grey power. The subsidy to new production of RES-E is slightly higher than the 
costs of producing renewables in the RO simulations, due to the higher production of RES-E. 
As consumers do not pay directly for the RES-E production, they do not suffer a loss in 
consumer surplus. Instead, consumer surplus shows a small increase because of the lower 
electricity prices. It should however be realised that the costs of the subsidy will indirectly 
affect electricity consumers in their role as tax payers. The premium subsidy for RES-E is 
funded from the government budget, which is financed by taxation. Either taxes will have to be 
raised to pay for the subsidy or other government spending will have to be limited. 
4.3  Comparing support schemes 
The effects on retail electricity prices and the distributional consequences of RO schemes and of 
premium subsidies vary considerably. Error! Reference source not found. summarize the 
main results. 
Table 4.6  Price and distributional effects of RO schemes and subsidies 2020, 20% renewable target 
  Standard RO scheme  Premium subsidies 
     
Certificate price (€/MWh)  56  0 
Retail power price (€/MWh)  65  54 
Producer surplus certificate market (mln €)  502  0 
Change in consumer surplus (mln €)  − 1379  286 
Subsidy (mln €)  −   1257 
 
Table 4.7  Price and distributional effects of RO schemes and subsidies 2020, 30% renewable target 
  RO scheme  Premium subsidies 
     
Certificate price (€/MWh)  104  0 
Retail power price (€/MWh)  84  53 
Producer surplus certificate market (mln €)  2335  0 
Change in consumer surplus (mln €)  − 4127  422 
Subsidy (mln €)  −   2587 
 
In the RO case, consumers suffer a loss in surplus, which consists of both a transfer to RES-E 
producers and a loss because of reduced electricity consumption. With a 20% renewable target, 
the transfer to producers of RES-E is limited, the loss in consumer surplus is mainly due to the 
reduced electricity consumption. With a 30% renewable target, the effect is more pronounced, 
with a 19% reduction in consumer surplus. In order to meet the higher renewable target, more 
expensive technologies are required. The resulting higher certificate price substantially   49 
increases the transfer to RES-E producers, as is illustrated by the producer surplus on the 
certificate market in the RO case. 
Under a premium subsidy, there is no direct transfer to RES-E producers. Consumer surplus 
shows a small increase because of the lower retail prices. RES-E has low marginal costs, 
therefore retail prices show a slight decrease. It should however be realised that the costs of the 
subsidy will indirectly affect electricity consumers in their role as tax payers. The premium 
subsidy for RES-E is funded from the government budget, which is financed by taxation. Either 
taxes will have to be raised to pay for the subsidy or other government spending will have to be 
limited. 
An alternative is to fund a subsidy through a surcharge on the electricity price, as is the case 
with the German feed-in tariff. In that case, electricity use will decline and consumer surplus 
will decrease because of the higher electricity price.   50   51 
5  Conclusions 
The major part of renewable energy is expected to come from electricity produced from 
renewable sources such as hydro, wind, biomass and solar energy. Over the years and in 
different countries, various policy instruments have been applied to stimulate RES-E 
production. The main instruments used in the earlier years have been tenders and subsidies, 
either in the form of feed-in tariffs or as premiums which provide a surcharge on the electricity 
price to compensate for the additional costs of renewables compared with conventional power 
production. More recent, renewable obligation schemes (or renewable portfolio standards, as 
they are called in the US) have been implemented. 
The major difference between subsidies and RO schemes is that the former is a price 
instrument while the latter is a quantity instrument which creates a new market for renewable 
energy certificates. So far, experience with RO schemes is too limited for definitive conclusions 
about the effectiveness and efficiency of RO as compared with subsidies. This is the more 
important because RO schemes are expected to be effective in developing new capacity 
especially in the longer run, given long term targets for RES-E production. In contrast, 
subsidies create a direct incentive to develop new capacity when the policy instrument is 
introduced. Moreover, other factors than instrument choice have had a significant effect on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the support schemes, such as non-economic barriers and local 
conditions. 
Another important difference between RO and subsidies concerns the risks which RE-E 
producers face under the different support schemes. Certificate prices in an RO should in 
principle be higher than subsidies, because producers of RES-E face price risks on the 
certificate market, risks which do not occur in the case of subsidies. Whether in practice 
subsidies will be efficient and therefore lower depends on the ability of the government to 
accurately predict the costs of renewables and set the tariffs or premiums accordingly. 
Moreover, costs of renewables might be higher with an RO because of regulatory risks. These 
will to a large extent depend on the credibility of the government in maintaining a stable policy 
over the years. With an RO, flexibility in target setting and design of the scheme comes at the 
price of higher regulatory risks for producers of RES-E and therefore higher costs. 
The cost-effectiveness of certificate markets will only be achieved if markets are efficient. 
One of the prerequisites for efficient markets is that there is no market power and no anti-
competitive behaviour. If the current developments in Dutch RES-E production continue, 
market power on a future renewable certificate market in the Netherlands will probably not be 
an issue, even if the RO should only rest on the retail market instead of on the whole electricity 
market. The current concentration rate is moderate and there is a downward trend. Moreover, 
the technologies which are expected to play an important role in the years to come such as wind 
off shore and biomass combustion, do not necessarily have to be owned by the established RES-
E producers. New co-firing capacity will be realised to a large extent through new coal fired   52 
plants. This might lower concentration ratios if this additional capacity is owned by entrants 
instead of incumbent power producers. 
Market power on a certificate market might be a problem if extensive use will be made of 
long-term exclusive contracts for the sale of certificates. It is difficult to predict the extent to 
which these long-terms contracts would be employed on a future certificate market in the 
Netherlands. If this would be the case, anti-competitive behaviour such as collusion or vertical 
foreclosure might in theory be a problem. Horizontal foreclosure is not likely to occur on the 
market, given the increasing potential for decentralised generation and therefore reduced 
economies of scale in electricity production and the possibility of selling electricity on the 
wholesale market to other electricity purchasers than retail companies. 
Extending the obligation to all purchasers on the wholesale market instead of only the retail 
market would reduce the likelihood for anti-competitive behaviour. Moreover, extending the 
scheme to include parties from other countries would further reduce the likelihood of 
anticompetitive behaviour and of foreclosure in an RO scheme. 
The effect on electricity prices and consumption differs considerably between RO and 
subsidies. Whereas RO schemes raise the retail price by up to € 30 per MWh to a level of € 104 
per MWh in the RO case for the 30% renewable target, the effect of the premium subsidy is to 
lower power prices to some extent. Electricity consumption ranges from 140 TWh at its lowest 
in the RO case with a 30% renewables to 157 TWh with a subsidy and a 30% renewable target. 
The largest loss in consumer surplus occurs with an RO of 30%. This is due to the high costs of 
the marginal technology needed to meet the 30% renewables target (stand alone biomass 
combustion). With the 20% renewable target, the marginal technology is cofiring, which is only 
slightly more expensive than wind on shore and off shore. For the same reasons, producer 
surplus on the certificate market is limited with the 20% renewable target and increases 
significantly in the 30% case. 
Under a premium subsidy, there is no direct transfer to RES-E producers. Consumer surplus 
shows a small increase because of the lower retail prices. RES-E has low marginal costs, 
therefore retail prices show a slight decrease. However, this effect is limited because of the 
integrated Northwest European electricity market. It should however be realised that the costs 
of the subsidy will indirectly affect electricity consumers in their role as tax payers. The 
premium subsidy for RES-E is funded from the government budget, which is financed by 
taxation. Either taxes will have to be raised to pay for the subsidy or other government spending 
will have to be limited. An alternative is to fund a subsidy through a surcharge on the electricity 
price. In that case, electricity use will decline and consumer surplus will decrease because of the 
higher electricity price. 
Producers of grey electricity will see a small decrease in producer surplus in all cases. 
However, the effect is limited because the electricity markets of Northwest Europe are 
integrated to a large extent.   53 
The distributional consequences of an RO will be different if the scheme would be extended to 
include parties from other countries. The effect on electricity prices will be larger if electricity 
markets of those countries involved are integrated. Moreover, different potentials for RES-E 
production from different technologies will affect the cost distribution between countries. An 
analysis of these effects falls outside the scope of this study. 
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